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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## GAILLARD'S FALL

Firm rightist opposition to any further concessions on North Africa, coupled with Communist obstructionism, brought down French Premier Gaillard on 15 April. The deepened cleavage between the right and non-Communist left presages a long crisis, and another fundamentally weak coalition government is likely to result. If such a makeshift solution does not materialize within a reasonable period, renewed pressure for the recall of General de Gaulle or for some other extra-parliamentary solution can be expected.

The crisis bids to be a prolonged one because the assembly has already recessed and will not reconvene until 29 April, following the cantonal elections scheduled for 21 and 27 April. Recall of the assembly prior to 29 April for an investiture debate is unlikely, since negotiations for a successor government will be difficult in any case, and, if the usual crisis pattern prevails, several unsuccessful investiture attempts will be made prior to a compromise solution.

President Coty, in accordance with tradition, is expected to call first those most responsible for the government's overthrow--Gaullist Jacques Soustelle, Independent Antoine Pinay, and Popular Republican George Bidault, who split with his party majority in an apparent effort to make a political comeback with rightist support.

Soustelle's prospects seem dim because of his extremist

position, and, at least until the crisis ripens, Pinay would encounter immediate hostility from the key Socialist party because of his economic and social views. Although Bidault's domestic policies would normally attract Socialist support, his recent swing to the right on North African issues runs directly counter to an evolution within the Socialist party toward a more liberal position.

Since Socialist leader Guy Mollet would fare little better at the hands of the rightist groups, Coty may turn at an early stage of the crisis to a center party leader. Rene Pleven of the Democratic Resistance Union is one of the most likely candidates and might be able to form a narrowly based center coalition with Socialist and Independent support, and perhaps even the participation of one or the other.

The duration and seriousness of the crisis will depend on whether the quarreling assembly factions can be brought to accept an early compromise. There are already signs of new pressure for the recall of General de Gaulle. The new high level of anti-American sentiment manifested during the 15 April debate will probably lend impetus to pressure either for De Gaulle or for a "government of national safety," held together more by anti-US sentiment than by internal agreement on North African and domestic policy.

One of the leading lobby groups, the National Association of Small Businessmen, has called

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for dissolution of parliament and new general elections. The outcome of the cantonal elections, in which rightists expect to make significant gains, may have an important bearing on the development of pressure in this direction.

North African Reaction

In Tunisia, President Bourguiba declared in a radio speech on 17 April that if France has not formed a government in a week he will again press his charges of French aggression in the UN Security Council. This public position is probably designed to allay the impatience of extremist factions within his government and party and also within the Algerian National Liberation Front. While he is unlikely to take precipitate action, the longer the French political crisis continues, the greater is the possibility in Tunisia of incidents involving French troops or civilians.

In Algeria, the fall of Gaillard apparently removed the immediate danger of serious civil disturbances by European extremists who had been aroused by the 12 April French cabinet

decision to resume talks with Tunisia on the basis suggested by the US-UK good offices team. Settler extremists sent letters protesting the American "attitude" toward North African problems to American authorities in Algiers and were almost certainly responsible for the explosion on 17 April at the building housing the United States Consulate General. However, the general strike of resident Europeans and "massive" street demonstrations which the extremists had threatened to instigate failed to materialize.

Rumors that certain young army officers, acting in collusion with local civilian extremists, will attempt to take over control of the Algerian Government have again been emanating from Algiers. Such an attempt by irresponsible rightist elements is unlikely.

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Nevertheless, dissatisfaction over the handling of the Algerian problem by a succession of weak governments is widespread in the French Army.

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**SOVIET SUMMIT TACTICS**

As the preparatory talks on a summit conference begin at the ambassadorial level, the USSR continues to insist it does not want to enter serious substantive negotiations prior to a summit meeting. It regards as a stalling tactic Western insistence that preparatory talks make some progress toward

agreement before a summit meeting is called.

The USSR does not look on a summit conference as an opportunity for concluding agreements worked out in detailed preliminary negotiations. Rather, it views it as a forum in which to publicize its stand

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on a few key issues, especially the suspension of nuclear weapons tests, on which it believes the Western position is most vulnerable.

The Soviet leaders evidently recognize that their campaign for a summit conference has not generated enough public pressure in the West to force the Western powers to accept Soviet terms.

some substantive discussions in the preparatory stage, the USSR is seeking to limit any substantive considerations to a foreign ministers' meeting.

The Soviet aide-memoire of 11 April said that the ministers could "exchange opinions" on some substantive issues but that the only purpose of the Western ambassadors' talks in Moscow would be to arrange the procedural details of a ministers' meeting. The USSR evidently believes that Soviet proposals at a ministers' conference would receive wide publicity and that the Western ministers could not resist Soviet pressure to set the date for a summit conference. If necessary to achieve this, the USSR might make minor concessions at the foreign ministers' level.

Recognizing that it cannot avoid

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**INDONESIA**

Indonesian government forces have reported they occupied Padang on 17 April within hours after marines and paratroops landed near the city. Resistance was described as light. Djakarta expects it will also have Bukittinggi by 22 April.

Overland, government forces are continuing their advance from the north through Tapanuli toward Bukittinggi and from the west across the Barisan Mountains toward Padang and Bukittinggi. Resistance in the Tapanuli area apparently is from defected rebels who had taken sanctuary there and not from the Third Regiment, which is stationed there. Recently stiffened resistance continues in the mountainous

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area of Central Sumatra, where the dissidents apparently are exploiting the terrain to good advantage.

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In North Celebes, the government claims to have occupied four more small towns in the Donggala area. Troop movements continue preparatory to a major operation against Celebes.

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no political approach to the dissident problem will be considered by the central government until after the occupation of North Celebes.

The bombing by a dissident two-engine aircraft of the Makassar airport on 13 April reportedly has been followed by an air attack on the airfield at Balikpapan, Borneo, on 17 April. These strikes followed closely an announcement of the formation of a revolutionary air force.

Colonel Jani, vice chief of staff of the army, has told the American assistant army attaché he is worried over the growing belief in the army that the United States is helping the dissidents. He is further concerned that the expected delivery of Soviet bloc weapons may weaken the army's generally anti-Communist attitude.

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## PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

## MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

Israel's Anniversary Parade

UN truce officials fear the military parade to be held in Jerusalem on 24 April celebrating Israel's tenth anniversary may result in clashes between Israelis and Jordanians despite precautionary measures taken by the two governments. Israel has held similar parades on previous anniversaries, but this year's event will be on a larger scale and will draw larger crowds, since the tenth anniversary is being publicized by the Israelis as especially significant.

The armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan limits the number of troops either side may have in the Jerusalem area to 1,600 men and bars heavy equipment such as tanks and armored cars. An Israeli official has stated that 5,000 members of the Israel Defense Force will participate in the parade along with most types of armament. Forty-nine tanks already have been moved into Jerusalem. Moreover, if the Israelis stage a fly-by over the city, they can avoid trespassing Jordanian air space only by exercising great care.

Jordan may well feel compelled to respond in some fashion to this violation to avoid criticism from Nasir's United

Arab Republic


The still unsettled issues involving Mt. Scopus and Israeli tree-planting activities in the neutral zone surrounding Government House, two high positions commanding the Jerusalem area, could add to whatever tensions might develop.

Israel has avoided raising the issue of Jerusalem's disputed status by not issuing formal invitations to the

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parade to foreign diplomats. Most of the diplomats gave prior indications that they could not attend because of the implied recognition their presence would give to Israel's claim to Jerusalem as its capital. The United Nations resolution of 1947, reaffirmed in 1949, calls for the internationalization of the city and its environs.

**Nasir's Trip to Moscow**

Nasir appears to be trying to mend some of his relations with the Western powers before he leaves for Moscow at the end of April, probably so that he can be in as strong a negotiating position as possible when he arrives in the Soviet capital. Word is said to have been passed to the Egyptian press to soften its normally virulent anti-American line, and cartoons and editorials now appear somewhat milder. However, Nasir's propagandists, taking their cue from his statements that nine clandestine radio transmitters supported by the West are attacking him, are still heavily engaged in assaulting the pro-Western governments of Iraq and Jordan. Despite his apparent contempt for these Arab monarchies, Nasir seems to have been stung by some of the charges their broadcasts have brought against him.

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The Saudi Government continues to be preoccupied with its financial problems. The "austerity budget" decreed last year by King Saud has failed to achieve the hoped-for economies, since it was promulgated several months after the fiscal year had begun and many government departments had already spent more than their total allocations under the new budget. As a major step toward restoring the Saudi currency to its official parity, International Monetary Fund officials have advocated a currency stabilization fund, possibly as large as \$100,000,000. A foreign loan would be required for the fund, and even this would not guarantee success unless Saudi Arabia's archaic monetary system is completely changed.

The financial crisis, particularly the decline in the value of the currency and the government's attempts to control it, may lead to labor unrest. Symptoms of trouble have been observed in the Eastern Province, where Aramco's operations are centered. There are rumors there that a strike, in the form of a simple nonreturn to work, might occur after the holidays which mark the end of

the Moslem holy month of Ramadan on 19 April. If trouble of this kind materializes, it might be an occasion for a test of whatever "new look" the government may have taken on from Crown Prince Faysal's assumption of broader powers.

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**THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS**

King Mohamed V dissolved the Moroccan Government during the night of 16 April following the resignation of all nine Istiqlal ministers in the 14-member cabinet. The King

may select as premier either former Foreign Minister Ahmed Balafrej, whom he has recalled from the Accra conference, or former Minister of Justice Abdelkrim Benjelloun, both of

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whom are leaders of Istiqlal's moderate wing and able supporters of the King's own moderate views.

The mass resignation is the latest tactic in a campaign begun by Istiqlal in the summer of 1956 to force the King to form an all-Istiqlal government. The King has resisted these efforts, but has tacitly acknowledged the need for a cabinet reshuffle, particularly replacement of his long-time friend, former Premier Bekkal, who had aroused the antagonism of Istiqlal by encouraging, probably with the King's approval, the formation of a strong opposition party. The King may still hope to retain some portfolios in the hands of his non-Istiqlal supporters.

The new government--even an all-Istiqlal cabinet--can be expected to maintain its policy of aloofness between East and West. The King and Istiqlal leaders are reported to recognize the economic importance of military bases in Morocco, but, as a sop to Moroccan sensitivities, will continue to insist on the formula recently enunciated by the King--that Morocco's privilege to demand evacuation be recognized when base rights are granted. The government will certainly continue to press for the evacuation of the French and Spanish ground forces which remain in Morocco.

**SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID PROGRAM TO YEMEN**


Sino-Soviet bloc commitments under the economic aid program in Yemen now stand at over \$50,000,000, and several projects have already been started. A Soviet credit which

Moscow officials value at \$35,000,000 is being utilized, and some 70 Soviet bloc economic technicians are now active in Yemen. In late March a Soviet vessel delivered a cargo of

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machinery and equipment for the harbor improvement project being carried out by the USSR at the port of Ras al Katib near Al Hudaydah. This is the first of a series of public works projects being implemented by Moscow under this credit.

Supplementing the Soviet credit, Communist China in January signed a technical aid and loan agreement worth about \$16,000,000, most of which is to be allocated for a public works improvement program. In addition, Communist China and Yemen concluded a long-term trade agreement in January under which Peiping will supply industrial and manufactured goods in return for agricultural products.

The European satellites for their part are constructing some industrial establishments in Yemen. Czechoslovakia is building cement plants and a

water supply system for Al Hudaydah. East Germany is constructing a power plant at Sana. The total cost of these projects and how they are financed are not known. East Germany and Czechoslovakia have opened commercial agencies in Yemen. For its part, Yemen granted the bloc an oil concession in an area covering most of the Red Sea coast from Al Hudaydah north to the Saudi Arabian border in February.

Over and above the economic aid being received by Yemen from the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Imam has accepted substantial amounts of military aid and at least 60 military technicians from the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The cost of this aid to the Yemeni Government has not yet been determined, but the value of the arms already received may be as much as \$30,000,000. (Prepared by ORR)

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
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**PROGRESS ON FITTING OUT OF SOVIET ATOMIC ICEBREAKER**

The Soviet press, in a recent article entitled "A Worthy Gift for 1 May," attempted to create the impression that the atomic icebreaker Lenin would be completed in the very near future. It is not likely, however, to be completed until the spring of 1959, when it will join the fleet on the Northern Sea Route. The Russians apparently had hoped to arrange for the vessel to visit some Western European cities including London this fall.

versary celebration in early November, actually took place on 5 December and was heralded as part of the observation of Constitution Day. It was noted

**SOVIET ATOMIC-POWERED ICEBREAKER**

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Work on the 440-foot, 16,000-ton icebreaker, the largest in the world, began in the

in the Soviet press at the time that this was only the first phase of construction and that much work remained to be done.

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Launching of icebreaker Lenin, showing pontoon

spring of 1956 at the Admiralty (formerly Marti) Shipyard in Leningrad. The launching, which the Russians may have hoped to time as part of the 40th anni-

Because the draft of the completed vessel will exceed the depth of the Leningrad shipyard's exit through the Morskoy Canal, the vessel has been equipped with bow and stern pontoons. The existence of the pontoons seems to indicate that the Lenin will be completed in Leningrad and then floated through the canal, possibly to Kronshtadt. It may be some time before the reactor is installed.

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The usefulness of the new icebreaker to Northern Sea Route operations should be considerable, since it will need refueling only about once a year and will be able to break ice up to six feet thick.

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(Prepared by ORR; Concurred in by OSI)

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## LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE NORTHERN SATELLITES

The highly industrialized satellites of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland are taking steps to correct inefficiencies in the use of labor and to improve productivity as a part of their general programs of economic reform. Some of these measures have caused unemployment, lowered morale, and increased the workers' antagonism toward their leaders. Labor dislocations stemming from these reforms will make more difficult the achievement of established production targets and may cause widespread worker unrest. In Poland this could result in bitter strikes, even though strikes have recently been discouraged by Gomulka.

Czechoslovakia

The campaign to rationalize the allocation of labor in Czechoslovakia calls for the discharge of over half the personnel employed by the Production, Communications, and Health Ministries in Prague and by corresponding commissariats in Bratislava. Other agencies will be affected as well. In addition, pensioners and some industrial workers are said to be destined for transfer to labor-short areas. This dislocation will affect over 100,000 persons.

Large numbers of the discharged white-collar workers, balking at the prospect of manual labor, are remaining in the urban areas, creating an unemployment problem in Czechoslovakia for the first time since World War II. Because inflationary pressures are increasing, the regime may be forced to cut purchasing power;

some wage cuts have been reported already, and workers have been warned that they may expect few increases in wages before 1960. The resulting decrease in the standard of living presumably will cause greater labor unrest.

Poland

An influential Polish editor informed the American Embassy in Warsaw that approximately 230,000 workers will be dismissed or retired. An estimated 200,000-300,000 are already unemployed. Although the regime maintains that there is a job for every person discharged, the reluctance of white-collar and industrial workers to do farm labor keeps urban areas congested with unemployed. Over 400,000 people enter the labor market in Poland each year, aggravating the problem.

Gomulka has already adopted a harder labor line--exemplified by his sudden curtailment of the management role of workers' councils and his statement last December that no raise in wages might be expected in the first half of 1958.

These factors, plus the uncertainty attending Poland's worker redistribution campaign, will probably intensify labor unrest and result in a growing number of strikes.

East Germany

The effects of the economic reorganization now under way in East Germany have not yet caused workers to suffer appreciably, because the labor shortage caused by the flight of refugees has kept down the featherbedding

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in factories, extensive in Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, the East German worker is unusually antagonistic to the regime at present because the reduction of the 48-hour week to 45 hours cut wages in some instances, while extensive propaganda favoring a possible increase in work norms has irritated the workers.

Serious shortages of personnel in some production sectors and the large number of "unproductive" white-collar workers ensure that sooner or later a campaign will be launched to rationalize the allocation of East German labor. 25X1  
(Prepared by ORR)

**SOVIET JOURNAL DISCUSSES SATELLITE COLLECTIVIZATION**

An article in the latest issue of the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist discusses the inevitability of complete collectivization in all Socialist countries and appears to call for an accelerated campaign in at least four of the Eastern European satellites. The four countries singled out--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Albania--have been pushing collectivization and a campaign to overcome peasant opposition during the past year. In addition, the article serves to remind the other satellites that they must eventually collectivize.

The article could be the forerunner of more direct and open Soviet intervention in satellite affairs. Such a marked reversal, however, of the USSR's post-Stalin policy of permitting each of the satellites a limited degree of latitude in determining for itself the speed and manner of achieving the goals of socialization seems unlikely. Moscow undoubtedly is aware that this could lead to unrest, and adverse reactions could be expected both within the Communist parties and among the populations.

The article acknowledges that collectivization is a "complicated and difficult" process which must be carried

through "gradually." It points out that such a policy cannot proceed "peacefully" since it requires the "inevitable" liquidation of peasant (kulak) opposition. It implies that the satellites must be ready to deal with violent peasant reaction in the final stages of collectivization. The article goes on to cite the USSR and Communist China as "useful models" and then says that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia "in particular" and Albania and Rumania secondarily are countries where "conditions" are now favorable for an intensified campaign against the remaining kulaks.

These "conditions" are not enumerated but they probably include achievement of at least 50-percent socialization of the agricultural sector and a regime secure enough to put down any resistance. While Khrushchev's recent speech in Hungary made clear the USSR would not hesitate to intervene in any satellite to preserve the socialist system, the USSR would be unlikely deliberately to initiate a program in a country where it felt intervention would be necessary.

The omission of any reference to East Germany, Poland, and Hungary is a recognition that these countries do not meet the required "conditions."

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None of them is over 40-percent socialized, all have poor economic conditions, and all have internal situations which do not permit a rapid increase in collectivization at this time. In East Germany and Hungary, the regimes might not be able to control peasant resistance without Soviet intervention; and Khrushchev specifically told the Hungarians to continue their moderate agricultural policy on his recent visit. In Poland, Gomulka's popular support is based in part on his own agricultural policy, which calls for collectivization much later, and in some form suitable to the country's peculiar conditions.

There should be no difficulty in carrying out the recommendations of this article in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. Bulgaria is already approximately 90-percent socialized, and the regime is determined to push ahead as rapidly as possible. In Czechoslovakia, last year's collectivization offensive is being renewed this summer, with a goal of greater than 80-percent socialization by the end of 1959 as against 68 percent at present. The Czechs are working toward completion of the agricultural socialization program in three years and have initiated a strong propaganda campaign against kulaks.

In Albania, approximately 65 percent of the arable land is now socialized, a rise from 38 percent since the end of 1956. The Albanians are working toward a goal of 85 percent by the end of 1960.

The Rumanian regime has been actively pushing collectivization, now more than 50 percent, but has apparently been meeting peasant resistance. There have been reports of active resistance in eastern Rumania in the provinces of Galati, Iasi, and Constanta in January and in Iasi in March, including one which said Soviet troops were required in a village in Galati. Perhaps as a result of this, party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej in a speech at Constanta on 3 April stressed the need for "consolidation" of the existing gains in collectivization and an increase in mechanization and agricultural production, thus implying a slackening in the rate of collectivization. Therefore, if Rumania is permitted to carry out this slowdown, the article would not have been meant to indicate a Soviet policy change toward the satellites. On the other hand, if Rumania reverts to active collectivization, this would indicate that the article was meant to signal more direct Soviet interference in satellite affairs.

(Concurred in by ORR)

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**CHINESE COMMUNISTS INVITE NEHRU TO VISIT TIBET**

Peiping's invitation to Indian Prime Minister Nehru for a visit to Tibet, announced in the Indian Parliament last week, probably results from persistent though cautious pressure on the Chinese Communists from Lhasa, which looks hopefully to India as a moderating influence on Peiping's ambitions to consolidate its domination

over Tibet. Requests by Lhasa that the Indian leader be permitted to come may have been circumspectly seconded by New Delhi, which historically has had close ties in Tibet. Tibetan resistance leaders in India were reportedly seeking help from the Indians earlier this year in promoting a visit.

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Stories in the Indian press have tentatively established the date for Nehru's ten-day trip, returning the Dalai Lama's three-month state visit to India in the winter of 1956-57, as "sometime in September." Peiping's willingness to have the Indian leader come to Tibet suggests that the Chinese Communists are confident they will be able to put on a convincing show for their visitor.

Peiping's objectives will probably be to impress the Indians with the "progress" achieved in Tibet under Communist guidance and to create an impression of friendly cooperation between the Chinese and Tibetans. The Indian political officer in Lhasa has presumably reported to New Delhi the sporadic armed resistance to Chinese rule which has continued in eastern Tibet since 1956, and Peiping is probably anxious to discredit reports of this activity.

The Chinese can be expected to shepherd the Indian leader through a tour of the Lhasa area, where they are in firm control, and to demonstrate the peaceful development of the country. He will probably be shown the new airfield, the expanded electric power plant, and other construction projects. Nehru's contacts with the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders will be closely chaperoned to preclude any expression of Tibetan hostility toward Peiping. The Chinese can be expected to foster the illusion of "autonomy" which Peiping has sought to create by withdrawing a number of Chinese technicians and political cadres during the past year and replacing them with Tibetans.

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**PEIPING AND MOSCOW APPLY PRESSURE ON JAPAN**

Communist China's refusal to carry out its private trade agreement with Japan and the USSR's intransigence on terms for Japanese fishing rights in northwest Pacific waters have put Japanese Prime Minister Kishi in an extremely difficult position just before a general election.

After reaching an understanding with Taipei on the Communist-flag issue, Kishi announced on 9 April he would support the trade agreement, but without recognizing Communist China or its "right" to fly its flag in Japan. Kishi

apparently believed Peiping would accept his unofficial assurance that Japan legally could not prevent the flag's flying.

Peiping, however, which has regarded the agreement as a major breakthrough in its efforts to establish official relations with Tokyo, took particular exception to Tokyo's emphasis on the agreement's unofficial character. The Chinese Communists apparently believe they can force Kishi to reverse himself and thus keep alive the Japan-Taiwan rift. To intensify pressure from

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Japanese business groups on Kishi, Peiping may stall present Sino-Japanese iron and steel negotiations; it has already delayed the departure of a trade mission staff which was to prepare for the projected Tokyo office.

Japan has responded to Peiping's attack by asserting it cannot change its stand and Peiping seems determined not to concede. Kishi thus is vulnerable to charges of frustrating Japanese sentiment for trade with the mainland. This is certain to cost him support if elections are held in May and may ultimately cause his downfall as prime minister. His successor presumably would be a Liberal-Democrat more inclined

toward closer relations with Communist China.

Kishi thus may be forced to seek a new solution, but any breach of his understanding with Taipei probably would result in severance of diplomatic relations by Chiang Kai-shek.

Japan's strong stand against Soviet pressures on the fishery issue appears to have wide public support. Japan and the USSR appear to be nearing agreement on a salmon quota of approximately 100,000 tons, but still disagree as to whether the Sea of Okhotsk will be closed to Japanese fishing after this year. Moscow apparently expects Tokyo's stand on this issue to weaken as elections and the fishing season draw near.

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**WEST GERMAN - SOVIET TRADE AND REPATRIATIONS AGREEMENT**

The West German - Soviet trade, repatriation, and consular agreement, to be formally signed in Bonn on 25 April, is being welcomed by all German political parties and the press as an important step toward promoting "detente and cooperation" between the two countries. Foreign Ministry officials are more cautious in their appraisal, since the repatriation understanding depends entirely on Soviet good faith.

Bonn appears to have made substantial concessions in the negotiations, probably because of the desire to use the treaty in countering opposition party allegations that Moscow would not deal with the Adenauer government after the Bundestag decision to accept nuclear weapons. The repatriation agreement takes the form of a Soviet oral

commitment to give "benevolent consideration" to the return, with certain exceptions, of those in the USSR who were German citizens on 21 June 1941--possibly 15,000--a considerable reduction from the 100,000 ethnic Germans Bonn demanded last summer. The return of even a few thousand, however, would be a major political advantage for Adenauer as was the return of the German prisoners of war after his 1955 Moscow trip.


Bonn acceded to the Soviet desire for a large increase in trade targets for 1958 through 1960. The new agreement sets total trade goals for the three years at \$750,000,000, reaching an annual level in 1960 of \$300,000,000, compared to the 1957 trade volume of \$157,000,000. A Soviet trade office, to be established in Cologne, will

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allow Moscow to increase the already large force of over 150 Soviet personnel in West Germany.



Although Soviet negotiators had hinted in late March

that the Bundestag decision to accept nuclear weapons would make a trade agreement virtually impossible, Moscow was evidently more concerned with its long-run objectives of a trade agreement and establishing close contacts with a country it expects to see exerting increasing influence in Europe. Indicative of Soviet interest in the agreement is First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's scheduled appearance in Bonn to sign it. Moscow probably hopes that eventually a post-Adenauer government in Bonn may take a more neutralist position and expects that in any case the trade agreement will tend to increase pressure by German business groups on the government for even further improvements in relations with the USSR.

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**THE SITUATION IN CUBA**

The Cuban rebels are continuing their hit-and-run attacks against scattered towns and army garrisons and appear determined to carry on their "war to the death" against President Batista, despite the losses sustained in the abortive uprising and general strike attempt of 9-10 April. Estimates of fatalities in last week's disturbances range from 50 to 350; more damaging to the rebel movement, however, was the weakening of its underground organization in Havana as a result of arrests and killings during police mop-up operations and internal dissension arising from efforts to fix the blame for the failure of the Havana uprising.

Although rebel leader Fidel Castro has charged that the anti-

Batista movement is receiving inadequate support from abroad, exile groups in several middle American countries have apparently been sending arms and men to the rebels.

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
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The size and military capability of the Castro forces remain significant in relation to Batista's

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military establishment of more than 35,000 troops. As in the past 16 months, Castro can probably carry on little more than a war of nerves. His most serious handicap is probably the weakness of his movement in Havana. It is unlikely that either an armed uprising or

general strike could succeed without strong support in the capital; both the attempt last week and a general strike in August 1957 failed in Santiago, capital of rebel-infested Oriente Province, after word arrived that there had been little response in Havana.

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**LAOTIAN ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS**

Prospects for the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) candidates in the election on 4 May for 21 Laotian National Assembly seats appear to be fairly good. French Ambassador Gassouin, who depreciates the Communist threat in Laos, is advocating the election of several NLHZ candidates and "fervently hopes" that NLHZ leader Prince Souphannouvong, whom he classifies as a nationalist and "head and shoulders" above his non-

Communist Lao colleagues, will be included in the new government.

The conservative leaders, despite the discipline and effective campaigning of the Communist front, appear unable to cooperate effectively among themselves or to maintain discipline among their followers. There is evidence of personal distrust among these leaders and each appears to be backing his own list among the 83

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conservatives in the field. The leftists, on the other hand, early agreed to a single slate of 21.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, who should logically be the rallying point of the conservative forces, has avoided strenuous campaigning and is advocating the election of four or five NLHZ candidates to the assembly. He fears that a sweeping conservative victory would drive the NLHZ back to the jungles and lead to a renewal of civil war. The most effective spokesman for the conservatives appears to be Katay, leader of the National party, whose activities are still limited by his recent stroke.

The conservatives are apparently relying for victory on their control of the election machinery and on the influence of the Laotian Army. If the government attempts to count out

the NLHZ after the balloting, however, or if the evidence of fraud, corruption, or voter intimidation is too gross, a serious reaction may be expected from the NLHZ leaders.

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estimate that the NLHZ will win between five and ten seats and possibly more. Such a success for the newly organized leftist party would constitute a serious setback for the government and might well undermine the government's basically pro-Western foreign policies.

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
The prolonged dispute over Malta's future status appears stalemated. After advocating integration with Britain as a solution to the colony's chronic economic weakness, Prime Minister Mintoff now threatens to campaign for independence because of his dissatisfaction with the amount of aid London is offering.

Because of his increasingly erratic moves--last December he pushed through the Malta legislature a resolution to sever ties with Britain--Mintoff's integration plan has lost support in British political circles. The colonial secretary recently suggested a five-year trial period before admitting three Maltese members to the House of Commons.

Mintoff, however, rejected the interim period aid offer of over \$2,800,000 annually in social services, unemployment assistance, plus \$70,000,000 in

capital assistance, and a budgetary grant this year of \$14,000,000. Mintoff demanded an additional \$5,000,000 and is proceeding to spend government funds as if the sum had been granted. He anticipates that local funds will soon be exhausted, which would probably bring his resignation and force Britain to call new elections for June or July, and perhaps govern under emergency powers in the interval. London appears prepared to reconsider its whole Malta policy if negotiations with Mintoff on the basis of the five-year interim plan fail.

There is comparatively little independence sentiment on the island, where the Royal Navy's dockyard is the chief industry, but Mintoff's dictatorial control of Malta's powerful Labor party gives him ample maneuverability in threatening Britain. He has a popular issue in his vigorous defense of the dockworkers' right to

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alternative employment in face of Britain's plan for gradually cutting down on dockyard operations.

The Nationalist opposition leader and former prime minister, Dr. Borg Olivier, [ ] has previously advocated independence. The Colonial Office believes

that the powerful archbishop of Malta--who has often opposed Mintoff--could probably ensure his electoral defeat. Mintoff possesses, however, a high nuisance value with his election plans and his capability of harassing Britain's large naval and air facilities on the island. [ ]

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**IMPROVED POSITION OF PERU'S NON-COMMUNIST LEFT**

The position of Peru's leftist but non-Communist APRA party, the largest political group in the country, has probably improved in recent weeks. The new foreign minister, Raul Porras, is close to APRA. Moreover, the party's support of conservative President Prado appears to have been very effective in ending the serious Communist-inspired labor unrest on 12 April.

APRA provided the mass support for Prado's election to the presidency in 1956, but it is so bitterly disliked by the military that its followers have been given no high-level government appointments except abroad. The military may be able to accept Porras' appointment, however, since the same cabinet reshuffle of 5 April resulted in dropping the minister of interior, thought to be pro-Communist by the military.

The cabinet reshuffle, which in part reflected popular dissatisfaction over Peru's growing economic difficulties, was followed by a week-long wave of Communist-led labor unrest and violence, particularly in

the mountain city of Cuzco, where the commanding general was held captive by rioters for several hours and the army during the week had to move in 500 troops with full battle equipment. In response, members of Prado's own political party joined with APRA and the small National Union party in Congress on 11 April to introduce a bill to give the President plenary powers to deal with Communists summarily without court action. At APRA insistence, Prado had also agreed by 11 April to round up Communist leaders and deport them.

The ending of all the strikes on 12 April--possibly because the Communists learned of Prado's intentions--may incline Prado to return to his former policy of vacillation. APRA's position in Peruvian politics has probably improved, nevertheless, because of the apparent effectiveness of its support of Prado in the face of serious Communist-inspired unrest, and APRA seems likely to continue its emphasis on anti-Communist action, and may thereby conciliate the military.

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### PART III

#### PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

##### SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT "REVISIONISM"

Since the meeting of foreign Communist leaders in Moscow in November, Soviet spokesmen have waged an intensified campaign against "revisionism"--liberal and nationalistic deviations from dogma and policies established by Moscow. Khrushchev and others have condemned as "revisionist" a wide variety of ideas which have gained currency in the Communist world during the past two years, challenge the supremacy of the USSR, question the validity of Communist dogma, and repudiate basic features in the Soviet system.

The presently mounting propaganda barrage against "revisionism"--labeled the "main danger" within the Communist movement--reflects the increased sensitivity of the Soviet leaders since the Hungarian revolt to even the slightest manifestations of nonconformity and criticism by Communists at home or abroad. While directed mainly at departures from orthodoxy outside the USSR, notably in Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Communist parties in the West, the campaign is addressed also at defiant Soviet intellectuals.

##### Rise of "Revisionism"

One of the principal repercussions of de-Stalinization and the Polish and Hungarian upheavals was the emergence within the Communist world of a current independent and critical thought which Moscow has indiscriminately branded "revisionism." While the scope of ferment has differed from country to country, the evolution of thought has developed along similar lines. From attacks on the cult of Stalin, the criticism spread to a general reappraisal of fundamental Soviet theory and practice. The most outspoken criticism has

come from a small but articulate group of Communist intellectuals, but the vigor of the Soviet reaction suggests that reservations about the Soviet system, however, concealed and uncrytallized, have affected wide circles of Communists in all countries.

The protest against Soviet domination of the Communist world is the form of "revisionism" most often denounced by Moscow. The protagonists of this school of thought, notably the Yugoslavs and to a lesser extent the Poles, contend that relations within the Communist world should be based on equality and independence. Tito and Gomulka have advanced the concept of "different roads to socialism" well beyond the limits intended by Moscow. "Revisionist" writers in Yugoslavia and Poland have urged that the Soviet-sponsored "proletarian internationalism"--i.e., hegemony of the Soviet party--be replaced by "peaceful coexistence" among Communist parties. The Chinese Communists also speak of the need for equality and independence, but have denounced those Communist parties which use their freedom to advance along "different roads."

A large body of "revisionist" opinion has questioned the validity of Communist dogma in the light of changes in the capitalist world. The Marxist theory of the pauperization of the working class under capitalism--the doctrinal justification for socialist revolution--has been heavily criticized by Communists in Poland, Yugoslavia, and the West. This school holds that economic and political gains of the working class in capitalist countries have introduced "elements of socialism" which censure the

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ultimate victory of socialism by evolutionary means and invalidate Soviet theories of class struggle and revolution. These ideas were most recently expressed in the draft program of the Yugoslav Communist party published on 13 March.

Many Communists, shocked by Khrushchev's disclosures about Stalin and by the Soviet intervention in Hungary, have repudiated the Soviet system as despotism. In their view, Stalinism was the direct outgrowth of the Soviet totalitarian system and should be succeeded by some form of "humanitarian socialism."

Moral revulsion against Stalinism has been common among Communist intellectuals, but the forms of protest have varied. Communists in the West have criticized mainly the authoritarian features of the Soviet system and have advocated democratic organizational principles, greater freedom of expression, and renunciation of violence as a means to a political end. Within the Communist bloc, where the avenues of protest have been severely limited, literature has been the main vehicle for expression of "revisionist" ideas. Soviet bloc intellectuals, particularly in Poland, have protested against official regimentation of creative activity and the perversion of human values under Communism.

**Soviet Reaction**

The Soviet reaction to "revisionism" has been a vigorous reassertion of Soviet primacy in the Communist world and a militant revival of doctrinaire Marxism directed against all the ideas disapproved by Moscow. Through ideological intimidation and organizational pressure, Moscow has attempted to restore discipline. The campaign against "revisionism," initiated in the summer of 1956 to counter the unsettling ef-

fects of de-Stalinization, has become increasingly aggressive, particularly since last November. Previously treated only as an ideological deviation, "revisionism" is now identified with political treason.

Within the USSR the attack has centered primarily on the intellectual and literary fields. Following the Hungarian and Polish revolts in the fall of 1956, the regime decisively reversed the trend toward relaxation of restrictive policies toward intellectuals, though without recourse to Stalinist terror. With Khrushchev's intervention in the arts in the spring of 1957, the official principles of party direction and "socialist realism" were authoritatively reaffirmed, and deviant writers and intellectuals were exposed to mounting official pressure for conformity. "Gloomy" descriptions of Soviet life like Dudintsev's novel Not By Bread Alone were singled out as examples of "revisionism" and calls were sounded at the republic party congresses in January and February to weed out "revisionists" from the party ranks.

As a result of these measures, a large degree of conformity has been restored in Soviet domestic life. Khrushchev himself recently implied that "revisionist manifestations" now are a thing of the past in the USSR. At a Kremlin reception on 8 February honoring leading members of the Soviet intelligentsia, Khrushchev expressed great satisfaction with the loyalty of Soviet intellectuals, in contrast to his threatening attitude in the spring and summer of 1957. As a precautionary measure against renewed outbreaks, however, the regime has stepped up its campaign against "revisionism."

Khrushchev set the tone for the present propaganda campaign in his October Revolution

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anniversary address on 7 November. He castigated "revisionism" at greater length and with more vitriol than he or any other top leader had before. He charged "revisionists" such as Djilas in Yugoslavia and Nagy in Hungary with "outright betrayal" of the Communist cause. Shortly thereafter the conference of foreign Communist leaders was convened in Moscow in an effort to gain support for a joint struggle against "revisionism" based on rigid principles laid down by the USSR.

Despite Yugoslav opposition and Polish reservations, the USSR obtained bloc-wide acceptance at the Moscow conference of its primacy and of nine "universal laws" for building socialism based on Soviet experience. The Soviet position was strongly supported by Mao Tse-tung, who had long agreed with Moscow on the "universal laws" and who in June 1957 had described "revisionism" as the principal problem of the bloc. However, although "revisionism" was declared the "main danger" within the Communist movement, each Communist party was granted the right to determine for itself the degree of danger, as well as to decide how the "universal laws" would be applied.

Probably in response to the failure to obtain full acceptance of the Soviet position at the Moscow conference, the Soviet press and radio since November 1957 have carried a steady barrage of attacks on "revisionism" by leading party theoreticians. From late November to mid-March, 55 full-length commentaries denouncing "revisionism" were broadcast to bloc and Yugoslav audiences, as against ten in the preceding six months. While most of these broadcasts have been beamed to Yugoslavia, no charges of "revisionism" have been levied directly at the Yugoslav party, in line with the ideological truce achieved by Khrushchev and Tito in Rumania last August.

"Revisionism" in Poland has been one of the main targets of the attack. While Moscow has publicly conferred the mark of orthodoxy on the Gomulka regime, it has attempted to bring pressure to bear on the Polish Communists. Polish philosopher L. Kolakowski has drawn particularly heavy fire from Soviet critics, who have treated him as one of the chief contemporary "revisionists."

In an apparent effort to immunize the Soviet population against "revisionist" influences, the regime has pointedly refrained from any serious discussion of the merits of arguments raised by its foreign critics. The Soviet press has treated Yugoslav developments with studied indifference during the past six months and has even avoided comment on the recently published Yugoslav draft program, although many concepts in it are "revisionist." The Soviet approach has been merely to reaffirm categorically the validity of Soviet theory and practice and to label all deviations as revivals of positions condemned by Lenin. This line of attack, which recently led to the reissuance of Lenin's collected writings on "revisionism," has been buttressed by a concerted campaign to silence criticism of the USSR by extolling Soviet technological and economic achievements.

**Prospects**

The concerted Soviet drive indicates that the Soviet leaders regard "revisionism" as a serious problem. By doubting the fundamentals of Soviet theory and practice, "revisionism" threatens to vitiate the militancy of Communist doctrine, weaken the authority of the USSR, and undermine the unity of the Communist world. In meeting this long-run challenge, the Soviet regime is banking heavily on ideological indoctrination and organizational pressure. Should these fail, the regime would be faced with the alternative of force.

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**INDIA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM**

India has made a small beginning in the nuclear energy field with a realistic program within its capabilities and supported by an abundance of essential raw materials. One reactor is in operation, two others are near completion, and several plants for processing raw materials are in operation or under construction. [redacted] nuclear energy program now is the largest in Asia [redacted]

technicians as well as scientists.

**Organization and Facilities**

Nuclear energy activity is directed by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), an independent agency responsible to the prime minister. The present advisory Atomic Energy Commission, soon to be given full executive powers, will become responsible for formulating the policy and budget of the DAE and for carrying out the government's atomic energy policies.


**Natural Resources**

India has the world's largest thorium reserves--estimated at about 500,000 tons in monazite sands, principally in Kerala. It ranks third or fourth in beryl reserves and production and also has substantial deposits of zirconium. New uranium discoveries in the Ranchi Plateau area of Bihar in northeast India appear promising, and Prime Minister Nehru recently claimed that India has about 30,000 tons of uranium reserves.

A processing plant at Alwaye in Kerala State, in operation since December 1952, is reported treating 1,500 tons of monazite a year and is being remodeled to double this capacity. A plant to extract uranium and thorium salts from the residue of the Alwaye process went into

**Personnel**

India's nuclear energy development is hampered because the few qualified scientists and technicians are overburdened with teaching and administrative responsibilities. Although Nehru stated recently that there were 700 scientists working in the atomic energy field, this figure probably refers to engineers and

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operation near Bombay in August 1955. A uranium-processing plant to produce uranium metal suitable for reactor fuel is expected to go into operation in 1958. A heavy-water plant now being built is to produce 10 to 15 tons annually by about 1960.

Scientific and technological research is carried out exclusively by government laboratories and universities, although only a few of the 33 universities have science departments. To overcome this handicap, the government has launched a substantial program for constructing and staffing new facilities during the next 15 years.

Many of the facilities of the Atomic Energy Establishment being built at Trombay--a suburb of Bombay--are in operation, and students from Egypt, Burma, and Thailand are already using them. The primary equipment is the Indian-built 1,000-kilowatt "swimming-pool" research reactor, fueled with enriched uranium supplied by Britain.

A second reactor is also under construction at Trombay and is scheduled for completion in 1959. This 10,000-kilowatt "NRX-type" research reactor is being jointly constructed and financed by India and Canada at a cost of \$14,000,000. It will provide a more advanced training facility than the first one and an increased number of radioisotopes.

A zero-energy reactor being built at Trombay is scheduled for completion by mid-1958. It is to be used for studies in fuel element arrangement and spacing, and reactor design.

The Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay inaugurated a training school for nuclear scientists and engineers on 13 August 1957, with an enrollment of 170 students. Plans call for

establishment of research laboratories, a plant for producing fuel elements, and a radiochemical laboratory for plutonium study.

The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research at Bombay has conducted all the research for the atomic energy program to date. Although its major interest is cosmic ray research, the institute has also dealt with nuclear physics instrumentation, reactor design, meson theory, and proton-neutron interactions. The institute has a 12-inch cyclotron, 100- to 200-kev (thousand and electron volts) Van de Graaff accelerator, a 1.2-mev (million electron volts) Cockcroft-Walton accelerator, a beta-ray spectrograph, and a mass spectrometer.

The University of Bombay's School of Science has done physics research, chiefly in spectroscopy. The Institute of Nuclear Physics of the University of Calcutta has a 400,000-volt accelerator from which neutron time-of-flight studies are made; also in operation are a beta spectrometer and an electron microscope, both of Indian manufacture, and a 38-inch 4-mev cyclotron. The Physics Department of the University of Delhi is carrying on research on fundamental particles and is studying the origin of cosmic rays in nova outbursts.

**Goals of the Program**

India's present nuclear energy program is aimed at fundamental research and application of nuclear science to agriculture, industry, and medicine. Production of nuclear power is of major interest to government and scientific leaders, however, because of the relatively high cost of conventional power. The secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy recently announced that India is considering the purchase of one or two nuclear

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power plants in the next few years.

Nehru has pledged that no Indian government will use atomic energy for other than peaceful purposes. The Indian Army, however, has held defensive atomic warfare exercises, and is likely to expand such training in the future.

International Relationships

Although India hopes to rely on domestic manpower and resources for its nuclear energy program, it probably will continue to need technical and financial assistance, primarily from other Commonwealth countries. India and Britain signed an agreement in December 1955 providing for close cooperation in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Canada and India signed an agreement on 28 April 1956 to cover the installation of the NRX reactor.

The Indian and French Atomic Energy Commissions are carrying on joint research

India has declined the United States' offer of a bilateral research agreement providing for financial assistance totaling \$350,000 toward the purchase of a research reactor, but Indian students have accepted the ICA's sponsorship to the International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering in the United States. The 21 tons of heavy water to be used in India's second research reactor have been purchased from the United States, and India has sold surplus monazite and thorium nitrate to the US. India does not support the US-proposed Asian Re-

gional Nuclear Center in the Philippines.

New Delhi has not accepted Moscow's offers of technical assistance despite Nehru's statements that India favors scientific cooperation with all nations. Cooperation with Soviet bloc countries is limited to an occasional exchange of students and visiting professors.

A common language, favored financial arrangements within the sterling bloc, and membership in the Commonwealth tend to direct India's bilateral or international activities into British or Canadian channels.

A supporter of the International Atomic Energy Agency, New Delhi now may turn more to the agency than to bilateral agreements. India is in a good position to barter its radioactive materials for equipment and facilities it does not yet possess.

(Prepared jointly with OSI)

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**POSITION OF PAKISTANI PRESIDENT APPARENTLY WEAKENING**

Pakistan's President Mirza may no longer be able to dominate the political scene in his country. These signs, which include indications that the pro-Western President no longer enjoys the full support of the army, suggest that he may have a hard time getting re-elected to office if national elections are held next November as scheduled. He also might be unsuccessful should he attempt to assume dictatorial powers in order to prevent a further worsening of the domestic political situation or to reverse a trend toward neutralism in Pakistan.

Mirza's efforts to play political parties against each other to prevent any threat to his authority during the past two years have resulted in his wooing and rejecting nearly every important party in the country. Like the Shah of Iran, Mirza has alienated many important politicians and has prevented the development of a stable government under a strong prime minister. His personal antipathy for former Prime Minister Suhrawardy, the most recent strong leader to appear as a rival, is well known. Under these circumstances, Mirza will probably find it difficult to find a major political party or coalition group willing to champion him in the forthcoming elections.

On 19 December 1957, the Republican party, which Mirza helped to create, revolted against his authority. It broke away from the government coalition, caused the fall of Prime Minister Chundrigar, Mirza's close personal friend, and estab-

lished a new coalition under Prime Minister Noon with the support of Suhrawardy, who had been ousted from the premiership by Mirza some months earlier. Mirza's prestige fell noticeably after this break, and the American Embassy in Karachi reported that he was attempting to regain it by making an unusually large number of public appearances throughout Pakistan.



In early March 1958, Noon apparently defied Mirza by sending a delegation to London to explore the purchase of some Canberra light bombers. Negotiations were undertaken in mid-March, despite an assurance by Mirza to the American ambassador on 7 March that he did not know of the matter and that the request for bombers should not be taken seriously.

On 18 March, Noon and the Republican party withstood an attempt by the opposition Moslem League to topple the Republican provincial government in West Pakistan in the hope of weakening Noon at the national level and preparing for his eventual downfall. Mirza was reported to have favored the Moslem League. His subsequent attempts in public speeches to dissociate himself from political intrigues were similar to his efforts last December.

The opportunistic agreement reached just prior to 18 March by the Moslem League with the leftist National Awami party assembly members for the purpose of attacking the West Pakistan government also left the league discredited in the public eye. National Awami party leaders

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are also probably disillusioned with the Moslem League, which probably cannot by itself ensure the election of a presidential candidate.

On 31 March, Governor Fazlul Huq of East Pakistan apparently attempted on his own authority to replace the Awami League provincial government, one of the mainstays of Noon's national government in Karachi, with a local coalition. Huq was himself dismissed the same day by Mirza following an emergency meeting on Noon's cabinet. Nevertheless, the fact that Huq felt he could get away with his action without obtaining the consent of Mirza, at whose pleasure he holds office, suggests that the President is no longer regarded as having real power.

Parliamentary efforts to unseat the Awami League government of East Pakistan also failed during late March and early April, and Suhrawardy's political viability was again evident. The Moslem League, which participated in these efforts, once more found itself impotent. It was not supported by the National Awami party, with whose representatives it had been allied in West Pakistan less than a month earlier. The National Awami party's support for the East Pakistan government at this time suggests it considers the Moslem League there a spent political force.

President Mirza, in seeking re-election next November, probably cannot count on the full support of a single major national party. He has antagonized the Awami League by ousting Suhrawardy from the prime ministership. The Republican party is suspicious of him. A number of Moslem League leaders dislike him. The leftist National Awami party, with some of whose leaders Mirza maintains relations, is not strong enough by itself to re-elect Mirza even

in the unlikely event Mirza should count on it for strong support.

These points are of importance to Mirza, since the president is elected indirectly by members of the national and provincial assemblies rather than directly by the people, and Mirza's re-election would depend on the good will of Pakistan's politicians.

Mirza might consider postponing national elections or ruling dictatorially. Should he postpone elections, he could be faced with strong opposition from political parties and a populace which has shown growing signs of desiring no further delay. Should he attempt to assume sole governing authority, he might be even more strongly opposed.

Under these conditions, 25X6  
Mirza's ability to remain a dominant figure would depend on 25X6  
the support of the army.

Mirza's awareness of the army's critical attitude is apparent in his statement to the American ambassador on 7 March that he intends to replace Ayub when the general's term expires at the end of 1958. Mirza apparently no longer trusts Ayub, who--with the strength of the army behind him--for years has been a strong backer of the ruling clique in Pakistan. 25X1  
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